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ABSTRACT
Suiter, Justin Lee. M.A. The University of Memphis. August 2012. The
Rhetorical Situation of Facebook. Major Professor: Dr. Joseph Jones.
The online social network Facebook is a site of considerable rhetorical
activity. Because it exists at the frontier of Web 2.0 or “new media” technology, this
rhetorical activity has certain novel features that require an expansion of the concept
of rhetorical situation. I apply Lloyd Bitzer’s original theory of rhetorical situation to
the context of Facebook in order to highlight the ways in which technological
advances and shifts in theory necessitate a broader understanding of rhetorical
situations. I argue that two of Bitzer’s three essential elements, constraints and
audience, are applicable to Facebook but must be adapted to suit its environment,
while the third, exigence, should be replaced with ethos, or the construction of a
virtual identity.
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Rhetorical Situations in the Age of Facebook

In his 2002 book The Language of New Media, visual arts professor Lev
Manovich questions the relevance of rhetoric in a hypertextual new media environment.
Manovich argues that hyperlinks and the like distract readers from arguments and make
them harder to persuade, concluding that while it is “probably possible to invent a new
rhetoric of hypermedia . . . the sheer existence and popularity of hyperlinking exemplifies
the continuing decline of the field of rhetoric” (77). Scholars in rhetoric and composition
may recognize that Manovich’s claims “demonstrated more a limited view of rhetoric
than reality” (Carnegie 164), but it is nevertheless true that any field devoted to the study
of communication must reckon with the fast-changing and frequently unfamiliar frontier
of new media. Teena Carnegie answers Manovich’s claim: “Do we need a new rhetoric
for new media? Perhaps not, but what we do need is an expanded understanding of how
rhetoric functions in new media” (165). This thesis attempts to answer Carnegie’s call by
helping to expand our understanding of a small—though influential—corner of the new
media landscape, the social network Facebook.
With nearly one billion users worldwide, a majority of whom are young
“millenials” or members of “Generation Y,” studying the communication happening on
this social network is valuable not only for understanding the frontier of new media
communication but also for making ourselves aware as instructors of the composing
practices many of our students now bring into the classroom. Texts, “tweets”—updates
on the website Twitter—and Facebook posts, for example, allow and encourage the
composition of casual, conversational messages governed by different rules and norms
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from academic or even business-oriented writing. In other words, due to the Internet in
general and social networks that offer a virtual, text-and-image based arena of social
interaction in particular, people have more opportunities and incentive for writing than
ever before. Yet some scholars do not consider communication through Facebook
interaction, twitter updates and text messages writing at all. The linguist John McWhorter
has called it “fingered speech,” arguing that this sort of communication is more like
talking than writing. It seems equally valid however to consider that perhaps new media
technologies like smartphones and social networks are blurring the line between writing
and speech in a way that forces us to reconsider both.
Since the middle of the 20th century scholars have considered themselves to be in
the regime of a new rhetoric, one that breaks from Aristotelian rhetoric. But the question
remains: Do we need a newer rhetoric than this? A look at recent composition journals
like Kairos and Computers and Composition Studies, journals devoted to examining the
intersection of rhetoric, composition, and digital technology, would suggest that the field
is already constructing one. But on closer inspection it would appear that we are not quite
ready to experience a paradigm shift, to borrow loosely from Thomas Kuhn. That is, it is
not clear that our field is at a crisis point where our current theoretical models and
metaphorical frameworks are insufficient for understanding digital composition. Rather
the field is still in the process of testing these frameworks against new problems and
questions emerging from new media.
The tendency to describe all forms of digital communication activities and
devices as “new media” can also obscure just how vast, complex, and varied the
technologies under this umbrella can be. Such vastness makes a meaningful definition of
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new media difficult, according to Leah Lievrouw and Sonia Livingstone, the editors of
The New Media Handbook. They cite the “rich interweaving of media technology, human
action and social structure” that generate what we call new media in explaining that “a
single definition can hardly capture the variety of ways that the term is used today” (23).
The term “new media” describes a vast and complex collection of spaces and
technologies; therefore, I resist suggesting that statements made here about Facebook can
be transferred to everything called new media. My hope and intention in maintaining
such a narrow focus is that a detailed description of a single part of the new media
landscape, along with other such descriptions, might take us in the direction of the
“expanded understanding” of this rhetorical space that Carnegie calls for. In an attempt to
find out whether and how we might expand rhetoric without abandoning some of the
field’s more useful metaphors for understanding the writing process, I will use Lloyd
Bitzer’s durable framework of “rhetorical situation,” conceived over forty years ago, to
analyze Facebook interaction.
My goals are twofold. First, I hope to test the flexibility and usefulness of Bitzer’s
theory for describing contemporary digital writing and updating it to suit the “situation”
of Facebook. Second, I highlight how Facebook’s particular combination and
arrangement of new media features—such as many-to-many communication, real-time
connection, and written conversation—create rhetorical spaces that could likely not have
been anticipated and so have not been theorized completely. I intend this study of
Facebook to reinforce the idea that fundamental rhetorical relationships—in this case the
writer’s relationship to her audience—can be affected by new media in numerous novel
ways. I further suggest that the complexity of Facebook’s writer-audience relationship
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represents a new frontier in interactive networks. I argue that this new frontier can be
read as a rhetorical situation containing all but one of the elements of Bitzer’s theoretical
framework of rhetorical situation, but that each element must be modified to suit both
contemporary rhetorical theory and the particular context of Facebook communication.
This paper will employ Bitzer’s three elements of rhetorical situations—
constraints, exigence and audience—in order to make an argument for the rhetorical
nature of Facebook interaction. I open with a discussion of the constraints constituent,
narrowing my focus to the constraints on discourse unique to computer-mediated
environments: the Facebook interface, the profile template within this interface, and the
environment of surveillance engendered by Facebook’s highly interactive and highly
visible common spaces. I consider not only how these constraints affect what users write
but also how they are able to construct identities on Facebook and what implications this
has on those identities.
Next I discuss exigence, or rather the lack thereof. Citing the interactive and
social nature of Facebook, I argue that all Facebook communications are governed not by
an exigence as such, but by the desire to construct a virtual identity, an ethos. I discuss
how the concept of ethos has been updated to suit a postmodern climate where identity is
not stable, but provisional, and one’s ethos is seen as a social construction born from
negotiation between writer and audience. I align this postmodern understanding of ethos
with scholarly work from other areas of the humanities on identity performance on
Facebook, and also examine the relationship between ethos and constraint as well as
ethos and audience.
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Finally I consider the audience constituent. I offer a brief history on the concept
of audience in rhetorical theory and ask how social networks force those of us in rhetoric
and composition to consider whether these notions of audience have kept pace with the
possibilities of new communication technology and the changing notions of subjectivity
characteristic of postmodernism. Then I examine how the highly visible interaction on
Facebook might be read according to popular theories, specifically Andrea Lunsford and
Lisa Ede’s adaptation of what they call the “audience addressed/audience invoked”
polarity. I argue ultimately that no single conception of audience can fully account for the
new media environment of Facebook.
Before these two sections is a brief history of Bitzer’s original theory, the
reactions it inspired, and recent attempts to put it to use in more contemporary contexts.
Within that section is a basic overview of Facebook’s layout and functions.
In order to explain some of my more complex points, or in any case those most
difficult to articulate, I include screen shots of actual Facebook pages. The included
parties have not had their names changed but were notified and all offered consent to
have their names, likenesses, and writing included in this thesis. For matters of
convenience, all of those included are members of my personal Facebook network.

Conceptualizing Rhetorical Situation

Conveying the impact of Bitzer’s work on the fields of rhetoric and composition,
as well as how both his work and the critical responses to it will be used throughout this
thesis, requires a brief overview of the history of Bitzer’s concept. In this section I
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discuss Bitzer’s original theory as well as the two or three responses most often cited in
work on rhetorical situation. This overview will expose some of the most important and
obvious shortcomings of Bitzer’s work—namely those uncovered by Richard Vatz—and
also introduce more recent attempts to update the framework for contemporary use.
Bitzer formally introduced the concept of rhetorical situation in 1968. His goal
was to describe the “nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create
rhetorical discourse” (1). In his first article on the subject Bitzer outlined a theory of
rhetorical situation that not only “revive[d] the notion” but gave it a position of primacy
as a “controlling and fundamental concern of rhetorical theory” (3). Bitzer’s most
comprehensive definition of rhetorical situation follows:
Rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects, and
relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or
partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain
human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the
exigence. (6)
A rhetorical situation is one whose features generate an opportunity to introduce
discourse in order to solve an exigence, “an imperfection marked by urgency . . . a
thing that is other than it should be” (6). What makes an exigence rhetorical is
that it can be “positively modified” by discourse. For example, exigences such as
natural disasters cannot themselves be altered through discourse and are therefore
not rhetorical. Something like the reduction of pollution, however, which could be
solved in part through public awareness in the form of a speech, is a rhetorical
exigence. The exigence is one of three “consituents” that Bitzer contends
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comprise all of the relevant elements of a rhetorical situation. The other two
constituents, or elements, are audience and constraints.
Bitzer takes care to distinguish a rhetorical audience from mere seers or hearers,
the distinction being that a rhetorical audience “consists of only those persons who are
capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change” (7). The
rhetor may or may not be aware of exactly who is capable of this sort of influence and
Bitzer offers no methods of identifying them, presumably because this would shift the
theoretical focus from the situation itself to the rhetor that speaks into it. In any event, the
audience’s role is to produce that action in service of which rhetoric exists.
Constraints he defines as “persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts
of the situation because they have power to constrain decision and action needed to
modify the exigence” (8). They may be generated by the rhetor or be already present in
the situation. Rhetorical style is a constraint because it imposes some limit on what can
be said and how. Beliefs and traditions can act as constraints. The presence of constraints,
an audience capable of influence and action, and an exigence toward which to direct that
action (and discourse) are the conditions sufficient for a situation to be considered
rhetorical.
A defining feature of Bitzer’s theory is that it drastically reduces a rhetor’s agency
in producing rhetorical discourse. In fact, Bitzer’s language places all of the agency in
the situation: it is the situation that “dictates the sorts of observations to be made; it
dictates the significant physical and verbal responses; and . . . constrains the words which
are uttered . . . ” (5) There is thus an uncontrollable externality to rhetorical situations that
the rhetor can only perceive and respond to. And the rhetor’s response is also largely out
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of his hands because the “situation must somehow prescribe the response which fits”
(10). Furthermore, “a situation which is strong and clear dictates the purpose, theme,
matter, and style of the response” (10). A rhetor does not so much create discourse as
become aware of what the situation requires him to say.
Bitzer claims that exigencies and constraints are “located in reality, are objective
and publicly observable facts in the world we experience, [and] are therefore available for
scrutiny by an observer or critic who attends to them” (10-11). So rhetorical agency is
replaced by situational awareness, by one’s ability to perceive a problem and uncover the
“fitting” response—because it already out there, determined, waiting to be discovered.
Rhetorical success depends entirely and only on finding it.
There are a number of critical responses to Bitzer’s framework, but the first and
perhaps most oppositional was Vatz’s in 1973. In “The Myth of the Rhetorical
Situation,” Vatz opposes the theory on the level of Bitzer’s “ ‘realist’ philosophy of
meaning,” claiming that such a philosophy “has important and . . . unfortunate
implications for rhetoric” (154). He argues that Bitzer’s position that “meaning resides in
events” is what leads him to consider rhetorical situations discrete and discernible,
“independent in meaning of those upon whom they impinge” (155). Vatz disagrees
categorically with this Platonist conception of reality, thus forming the crux of his
argument:
Except for those situations which directly confront out own empirical reality, we
learn of facts and events through someone’s communicating them to us. This
involves a two-part process. First, there is a choice of events to communicate. The
world is not a plot of discrete events. The world is a scene of inexhaustible events

!

8!

!
which all compete to impinge on what Kenneth Burke calls our “sliver of reality.”
(156)
For Vatz meaning “is not discovered in situations, but created by rhetors” (157,
emphasis original). The fundamental disagreement between the two scholars hinges on
the necessity of communicating ideas. It is by ignoring the “initial linguistic depiction” of
the rhetorical situation that Bitzer is able to describe its reality as external and objective.
Correctly placing the construction of meaning inside the rhetor, Vatz argues, increases
the rhetor’s moral responsibility to her message. As a creator and not merely a reflector
of meaning, the rhetor must now answer for what she chooses to include, for how she
chooses to communicate her interpretation of reality.
The position that Vatz promotes is essentially a mirror opposite of Bitzer’s:
rhetoric is not situational, situations are rhetorical; exigence doesn’t invite utterance,
utterance invites exigence, and so on (159). The suggestion of Vatz’s response is that
rhetoric is meaning-making through symbolic interchange: “if . . . you view meaning as a
consequence of rhetorical creation, your paramount concern will be how and by whom
symbols create the reality to which people react” (158).

Reconciliations and Adaptations

The polarity between Bitzer and Vatz left a space that scholars have since
attempted to fill by borrowing from each and offering new insights. I follow in the
tradition of those others who have attempted to reconcile the salient and compelling

!

9!

!
aspects of Bitzer and Vatz without abandoning the concepts that Bitzer introduced. Scott
Consigny offers the most productive reconcilitation of the two competing stances:
The rhetorical situation is an indeterminate context marked by troublesome
disorder which the rhetor must structure so as to disclose and formulate problems;
hence Bitzer errs in construing the situation as determinate and predetermining a
‘fitting response.’ But the rhetorical situation is not one created solely through the
imagination and discourse of the rhetor. It involves particularities of persons,
actions, and agencies in a certain place and time; and the rhetor cannot ignore
these constraints if he is to function effectively. (178)
This recasting of rhetorical situation as one centered on the rhetor rather than the external
situation but not entirely constructed by the rhetor offers a foundation for appropriating
Bitzer’s relevant situational elements: exigence, audience, and constraints.
In “The Rhetorical Situation Revisited,” Mary Garret and Xiaosui Xiao write that
“although there has been disagreement over how to construe the various elements of the
rhetorical situation and their relations to one another, the usefulness of the concept has
not been questioned” (30). Consigny’s position involves using the situational framework
to privilege rhetorical topics; Donna Gorrell represents situation in the form of a Venn
diagram. Yet none of the interpretations offers an all-encompassing theory of rhetorical
situation.
Surveying the literature in an attempt to find a framework for exploring the
rhetorical situation of China’s 19th century Opium Wars, Garret and Xiao realized that
they would need to make their own modifications to suit the specific situation they
planned to research. They write that they “came to feel that each [interpretation] made a
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valuable contribution in highlighting certain aspects or possibilities of the rhetorical
situation, yet none accounted for the complex interactions and the nuances of the case we
were pursuing” (32). Their work seems to suggest that the continued usefulness of
rhetorical situation lies in part in its flexibility as a concept, its receptiveness to being
tweaked and recast to suit and illuminate specific rhetorical contexts. Along with these
are articles such as Barbara Biesecker’s that directly attempt to bring the rhetorical
situation into step with postmodern notions of subjectivity and identity. I combine
perspectives like Biesecker’s with the complementary work of scholars like Nedra
Reynolds, Johanna Schmertz and Julie Cristoph-Nelson to update the constituents of
rhetorical situation to suit contemporary theory.
There have also been some attempts to consider how the World Wide Web affects
the communication triangle that lies at the heart of rhetorical situations. Michael W.
Goss notes in “Revisioning Kinneavy” that while the computer itself did not have a great
effect on the nature of the rhetorical situation, “more recent changes in media are not so
easily adapted to” (1). Goss calls for “the first major revision in our view of the rhetorical
situation—specifically, the new paradigm of writing for the World Wide Web” (2). Goss
focuses on the construction of web pages as a new form of composition that requires new
considerations. The composition, in this sense, is a web page. He finds that the Internet
necessitates an expansion of rhetorical situation that accounts for the effects of media—
not just one that considers how different media change the process of composition, but
one that “actually include[s] it as a parameter in the planning and production process”
(8). While this study does not concern itself with the technical aspects of constructing a
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website, it does explore the novel composing opportunities made available by such
construction.
It is with these treatments of rhetorical situation in mind that a rhetorical analysis
of Facebook communication might be undertaken using Bitzer’s terminology. Certain
forms of communication on Facebook are unique to the site and will require significant
modification of Bitzer’s original definitions of his constituents. Furthermore, all of this
communication is taking place in a computer-mediated environment and therefore
introduces new kinds of constraints, complicates conceptions of audience, and forces any
researcher to update Bitzer’s theory to account for the effects that technology has had on
writing and postmodernism has had on our understanding of subjectivity. Here I offer a
consideration of the ways in which Bitzer’s constituents must adapt to Facebook’s
rhetorical situation. This section also serves as a quick primer on the social network.

Facebook and the Rhetorical Situation

Any attempt in the field of rhetoric and composition to consider the writing taking
place on Facebook must at some point answer the question, “In what sense is writing on
Facebook rhetorical?” What exactly do people write on the site? What can they write,
and what creates those boundaries? What is Facebook?
To call Facebook a website is misleading. That characterization fails to capture
both Facebook’s importance to the lives of its users and the ambitions of its founders. It
seems more accurate to describe it as a relative of the multi-user domain (MUD), a term
popularized in the 90s to describe role-playing games (RPG) that took place in an
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alternate virtual reality. Its most important distinction from the traditional MUD/RPG is
that one’s “role” on Facebook is to project their self, as they exist, into an electronic
space where others are doing the same. A major allure of the MUD is that it offers an
escape from physical reality, from one’s “real” life. In contrast, social networks like
Facebook can best be understood as an addition to reality, an enhancement of people’s
existing social lives. Research suggests that users understand Facebook primarily as a
tool for augmenting social relationships established or continued in the physical world
(Turkle 2005, 2010; Baron 2010).
As of this writing Facebook has over 900 million users. This means that
increasingly, and especially in industrialized societies, most of the people that a Facebook
user knows in physical life also use Facebook. Such large participation leads to large
networks of Facebook “friends”—users that one invites into her network, or whose
invitation the user accepts. As the subsequent sections will show, these large networks
are interconnected and made visible to individual users in novel ways, and this
connection leads to new kinds of rhetorical situations.
It is true that there are numerous ways to communicate on Facebook—messages,
posts, videos, comments. It is also true that every individual communicative act on
Facebook, of which there are millions every day, has an immediate purpose and context
that cannot be generalized, meaning that each of these could be considered a unique
rhetorical situation. However, this exploration endeavors to characterize all acts of
communication on Facebook as adhering to a single rhetorical situation. I maintain that
whatever their unique qualities, individual statements on Facebook share characteristics
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that allow them to be understood as a single type of communication, or more accurately
styles of communication that can be linked to a common purpose.
Taking into account the problems with Bitzer’s rhetorical situation expressed by
Vatz and a number of others through the years, I endeavor to adopt elements of the
structure and the terminology of Bitzer’s theory without accepting his insistence that
meaning resides exclusively in events. Nor will I simply transpose his constituents with
their exact meanings and interplay onto this study of Facebook—the constituents will be
adapted to better suit their environment.

Constraints

The concept of constraints on discourse has broad applications. Bitzer considers
the concept broadly in part because his own work attempts to account for the whole of
rhetorical discourse. He defines constraints as “persons, events, objects, and relations
which are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and
action needed to modify the exigence” (8). Anything with the power to “constrain
decision or action” can then be considered a constraint. For Bitzer both the character of
the audience and the character (ethos) of the rhetor—in other words, the other two
constituents as conceived in this study—might be classified as constraints.
Without denying the relevancy of a broad conception of constraints, I focus here
on two types of constraint central to Facebook’s computer-mediated and social nature.
Both constraints that I identify are products of Facebook’s user interface—that is, the
portal(s) through which users interact with Facebook and with one another. The first
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constraint identified is a component of Facebook’s interface: the template by which users
create their Facebook profile. I discuss how the template restricts opportunities for selfexpression and encourages users to understand themselves and others in specific ways.
The second constraint is the role of one’s Facebook network in “policing” discourse by
defining behavioral norms and discourse boundaries. Such constraining behavior is a
product of the high interactivity made possible by Facebook’s interface, especially its
News Feed feature. I close with a brief discussion of how these constraints relate to one
another and what effect they have on the other constituents of the rhetorical situation.
For the sake of clarity and simplicity what I call “interface” may be considered a
point of intersection between many combinations of interactions between users,
computers, software, and content. As Carnegie has noted, “it would be impossible to
separate out the various interactions as they layer over each other” (165). They are all
part of the interface through which one “uses” Facebook. Different parts of the interface
serve different rhetorical functions, however. In making a distinction between the
interface that facilitates interactivity on Facebook and the template through which users
construct the static elements of their virtual identity, I am distinguishing between types of
activity available through the same primary interface.
Carnegie writes that “at its most basic and broadest, [interface] refers to a means
or place of interaction or a meeting-point or common ground between two parties,
systems or disciplines” (165). Carnegie then narrows this definition somewhat and in
doing so describes its appeal and importance to rhetorical study: “whenever two things
come into contact and interact, an interface exists. The interface facilitates and defines
interaction, and it takes both concrete and abstract form” (165, italics added). As a
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computer-mediated communication technology Facebook must have some way of
connecting its nearly one billion users in a common “space,” and the user interface is that
method of connection. Interfaces are inherent to computer-mediated communication
because computers usher geographically dislocated individuals into common virtual
spaces. A computer monitor itself is an interface. It is a site of interaction and
furthermore the monitor defines to some degree what can be done on a computer.
The degree to which an interface shapes communication is often obscured by its
ubiquity in computer-mediated environments. Moreover, the ideal interface from an
engineering perspective is one that goes unnoticed. Alison J. Head writes in her book
Design Wise that “many software developers say that the best designs are ones that are
never given a second thought about. They describe this quality as invisibility, and it is the
hallmark of effortless user interaction and good design” (quoted in Carnegie 165-66).
One might be uncritical of the ubiquitous, but one is unaware of invisible. It is by
applying a critical awareness to our use of computer-mediated technologies—by keeping
an eye always on what Cynthia and Richard Selfe call the “interested” and ideological
nature of interface design—that we can better understand the ways in which interface
features shape our interactions with others on Facebook.

Templates: Simplifying Processes by Reducing Choices

The first action that new users complete after signing up for Facebook is the
creation of a profile. This profile acts as the portal into a user’s activity and is how other
users gain access to one’s photos, contact information, interests and other personal
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information. Facebook profiles are in a sense the “face” or even the body of one’s
Facebook identity, the public image. As such profiles have been compared to self
portraits.
In “Friending the Virgin,” Larry Friedlander of Stanford University argues that
“previous practices of portraiture have anticipated and prepared the way for selfpresentation on [social networking sites]” (1). Portraits, especially those of royals,
immortalized the subject’s physical likeness and articulated social status. A number of
signifiers were considered when sitting for a portrait from one’s clothes to facial
expression and background setting. Drawing further parallels between Facebook profiles
and traditional portraits Friedlander describes the aims of a portrait:
A successful portrait reflects the subject’s sense of herself, but it must
simultaneously convince a viewer. To do so, it must capture, synthesize, and
convey a persuasive image of a subject, and legitimize these representations . . .
portraits are personal and public, so they must communicate in a recognizable
language and employ public symbolic modes. (4)
This description suggests an awareness of audience. After all, portraits were
commissioned in order to be seen and often represented attempts to control or manipulate
the subject’s image in the eyes of her audience.
Self-portraits exist for similar purposes. Christine Rosen, in “Virtual Friendship
and the New Narcissism,” writes that “by showing the artist both as he sees his true self
and as he wishes to be seen, self-portraits can at once expose and obscure, clarify and
distort” (173). Seen as a form of self-portrait, one’s Facebook profile is where the image
that one wishes to project is first cultivated. However, Facebook does not simply allow
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one to represent herself however she might wish through the profile. For ease of usability
and aesthetic unity, Facebook offers a template to facilitate this process.
Templates by nature constrain action by imposing specific limitations on what can
be written. In “Prescripts: Authoring with Templates,” Anders Fagerjord calls the type of
template used to create Facebook profiles an interface prescript, and notes that “interface
prescripts . . . make it simpler to create by taking away choices,” and they “reduce the
complexity of creation software by limiting the possible range of expression” (Fagerjord).
Facebook standardizes profiles by limiting the ways that people can describe themselves.
Users choose a photo from those that they have uploaded and then fill in a series of eight
forms: Basic Information, Friends and Family, Education and Work, Philosophy, Arts
and Entertainment, Sport, Activities and Interests, and Contact Information (see fig. 1 and
fig. 2). The result is that users must describe and present themselves, at least when it
comes to their static representation, in the terms that the template encourages. A glance
at figures 1 and 2 might suggest how templates shape our perceptions of others in
Facebook in predictable, potentially reductive ways. However, the following template
forms—Arts and Entertainment, Sports, and Activities and Interests, highlight the ways
in which Facebook’s template encourages users to build identities through alignment with
and appropriations of pop culture.
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Fig. 1. Basic Information template from Facebook profile interface.

Fig. 2. Philosophy template from Facebook profile interface.

Fig. 3. Arts and Entertainment template from Facebook profile interface
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When users list their favorite books, music, or movies in the template form, those listings
show up in profiles as “thumbnails” that link to the Facebook page for the particular item.
That user can now identify which of their Facebook friends, if any, share an interest in
their favorite pop culture items. Books, movies, bands and television shows spawn
communities or “groups” of Facebook fans. These thumbnails provide ways of knowing
how well another’s interests align with one’s own. For example, if I were to see that my
Facebook friend Ryan Johnson (fig. 4) and I share and interest in the television show
Seinfeld, I might see what other television shows he likes due to my perception of our
similar taste. Seeing that he also likes the show 30 Rock, I might click on its thumbnail
and be directed to the 30 Rock Facebook page, where I would be shown which other of
my Facebook friends have “liked” the show (fig. 5).

Fig. 4. Completed Arts and Entertainment section, Ryan Johnson’s profile page.
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Fig. 5. View from 30 Rock fan page.

Scholars have framed Facebook’s encouragement of its users to construct
identities through pop culture and brands both positively and negatively. Richard L.
Freishtat disapprovingly aligns this behavior with increasingly consumerist ideologies
and writes that “in public view online, youth manage identities using symbols with shared
meanings (particularly brands) . . . and readily accept the reduction of individuality down
to the expression of self through objects that others have created” (519). While not in
total disagreement, Bronwyn T. Williams cautions against locating blame within
Facebook. He reminds us that “popular culture has long served functions of both identity
construction and community building” and that “long before online technologies, people
would make statements or judgments about identity and taste based on the popular
culture references of those they would meet” (26).
As already mentioned, such a profile template does serve practical purposes for
Facebook. As a network with an ethos of connection, it makes sense that Facebook would
encourage the construction of such pop-culture-based communities. Furthermore, it
provides an impetus for the creators of culture items to maintain a Facebook presence.
Williams’s suggestion that Facebook simply offers an easy way for users to congregate
and identify around pop-culture still of course implies that people are identifying
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themselves this way; however, it recasts Facebook as satisfying and enabling an extant
collective desire rather than generating one. In this conception Facebook offers users a
way to share cultural and personal information simultaneously and blurs the line between
the two.
It is not the goal of this study to debate the ultimate consequences of this sort of
identification. It is nevertheless apparent that the profile template encourages users to
identify with digitized forms of culture from the beginning and in doing so constrains the
ways in which users can construct the static element of their Facebook identity. The static
element, however, makes up only a fraction of one’s Facebook identity. The Facebook
interface also constrains one’s active use of Facebook.

Interface, Surveillance, and Normalization

Facebook’s interface does simplify a user’s ability to share and compose with
multiple forms of media. As I will discuss, this is important to Facebook’s ongoing
success and desirability. Moreover, its interface facilitates high levels of interactivity and
visibility. This combination of what users share with how it is presented within the
network creates an environment where, as Kristin Arola writes, we “understand ourselves
and each other through . . . the actions we take and the actions of others” (9). I will
describe how this “relational” understanding and the high visibility of discourse that
makes it possible have been linked by some scholars to the “policing” effect of constant
surveillance, and use this connection to suggest a relationship between Facebook’s
Interface and the way that users go about constructing an ethos.
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Facebook’s popularity depends in part on its ability to facilitate what Henry
Jenkins terms “convergence culture” (2). Broadly, convergence culture includes,
according to Williams, “opportunities for participation by the audience and the flow of
information across multiple media platforms” (25). Convergence culture is a product of
the availability of many different forms of cultural media on the Internet. Lev Manovich
notes that “we are no longer interfacing to a computer but to culture encoded in digital
form” (70). He explains that this shift toward culture being either created or presented
through the computer makes the computer interface one of our principle means of
“interacting with cultural data” (70).
Facebook facilitates multimedia composing by allowing users to easily
incorporate photos, videos, and links to other media into their messages and status
updates. In effect users can appropriate culture items of interest to them across different
media and share them in a single space. The text box interface into which users type
messages (fig. 6) offers a button for sharing photos and videos from one’s desktop or
hard drive.

Fig. 6. Status update text box from Facebook profile page.

If a user copies a link into this text box, be it to a video or article, the link shows
in both URL format and with a title, photo, and brief description of the home site of the
link (fig 7). This feature allows users to browse their news feeds and determine their
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interest in a friend’s post without having to click through. Furthermore it serves as
evidence that Facebook’s interface is designed to simplify the process of sharing
“encoded” pieces of culture.

Fig. 7. Status update text box contacting a link to an article from “The New Republic”
website.

Having established that Facebook discourse centers on sharing a combination of
personal and cultural information of interest to the user, I will discuss how this
information reaches a person’s network and also how collectively the network’s texts and
the users that create them normalize certain behaviors and types of discourse. These
constraints are a product of Facebook’s technological innovation, and thus highlight the
ways in which the rhetorical element of constraints might be adapted to such a
contemporary rhetorical situation.
The primary areas of the Facebook interface for ongoing communication are the
Wall and the News Feed. One’s Facebook Wall (Fig. 8) is where friends can access the
static personal information made available through the profile templates (see the
discussion that follows). It is here that Facebook aggregates and archives all of a user’s
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status updates and posts “stories” about that user’s activity—who she became friends
with, her comment on a friend’s Wall, that she “liked” a new band or movie. It is also on
a user’s Wall that anyone who wishes to communicate directly with that user writes a
post. Critical to understanding Facebook is knowing that, unless a user chooses to delete
certain items or block certain users’ access, anyone in her network can scroll through her
wall and see every post she has ever written and every post that has been written to her.
Arola takes the view that participation and interaction, facilitated by the Wall, are the
most substantial forces in shaping one’s Facebook identity. This view leads to her claim
that “you are what you post and what others post about you” (10).

Fig. 8. My Facebook profile and Wall

The News Feed (fig. 9) amplifies this interaction and participation. It connects a
user with the real-time activity of his entire network. What the user’s friends write and
share with one another is here. It is also how his or her own writing is disseminated. If
that user expresses an idea or shares a link in a status update, it shows in the news feeds
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of those in his network. Arola claims that “the visual dominance of the News Feed
suggests its importance, and because it is so much larger than any other section of the
page, it encourages us to understand others through their actions on Facebook. It also
encourages us to understand ourselves in relation to the actions of others” (10).

Fig. 9. My News Feed

In a description of her own first account with the Facebook News Feed shortly
after it was introduced, E.J. Westlake describes how this feature actively encourages
surveillance:
The sensation of encountering Facebook News Feed for the first time is hard to
describe. I remember thinking that it was a bold move for Facebook, but I also
remember feeling a little strange knowing that my every move (well, almost every
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move) would be seen by all of my Facebook friends . . . I wasn’t sure I wanted
everyone to know the comments I had posted under a friend’s photographs or see
what I was posting on other people’s Walls. Granted, these things are publicly
available, but one previously had to search for them; now News Feed announced
them to anyone in my Facebook social circle. (22)
The News Feed not only makes all one’s activity more visible to the network, it draws the
network’s attention. The Feed is Facebook’s “home” page; it is the first thing that users
see when they log on. Users must click to get to their own profile, but the News Feed and
its constantly updating ticker of other’s compositions and activity is presented directly to
them.
Westlake argues that the News Feed has created an environment of constant
visibility but does not see users as exhibitionists or “passive” acceptors of “intrusive
surveillance.” Rather, Facebook discourses “are energetic engagements with the panoptic
gaze: as people offer themselves up for surveillance, they establish and reinforce social
norms, but also resist being fixed as rigid, unchanging subjects” (23). In Westlake’s view
the social nature of Facebook and the visibility afforded therein does not encourage, as
some have suggested, “deviant exhibitionism”—that is, displays of individuality that
break or fall outside social mores or agreed upon values—but instead teaches users how
to interact appropriately and serves as a “policing” mechanism to that end. Richard
Freishtat and Jennifer Sandlin imagine Facbeook as an electronic frontier:
Joining Facebook’s community and adhering to its cultural norms gives users the
social capital necessary to homestead in the digital world. Allowing the constant
surveillance, potential lack of privacy of personal information, and engaging with
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the platform and other users in prescribed ways are the price to be paid, because
‘The territory may be free for the taking, but it’ll cost you something to get out
there to it.’ (514)
The constraints placed on communication by Facebook’s interface and the
particular form of communication it makes possible do have an effect on the way we are
able to present ourselves, but the templates that form these constraints also allow users to
easily construct an online identity that is reflective of—though more easily controlled
than—the fragmented, nuanced, contradictory and continually changing selves that they
construct in their physical life.
Bitzer figured constraints into his rhetorical situation because of the role they play
in shaping thought and action. He was general nearly to the point of vagueness in his
description of this element—“standard sources of constraint include beliefs, attitudes,
documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives and the like” (8). His general
description leaves us with a malleable concept. I have attempted to apply it to the context
of Facebook in order to explore what sorts of novel constraints computers, the Internet,
and finally new media technology have brought about. There are doubtless other
constraints acting upon Facebook writers that I have failed to mention here, but the two
that I have—interface/template design and constant visibility or surveillance—are
specific, contemporary examples of Bitzer’s concept.
Bitzer mentions that a rhetor “harnesses constraints” (8). While this statement
suffers from Bitzer’s more general weakness of assuming a rhetor’s complete control
over her discourse, it is true that writers learn to work through and around their
constraints. Indeed, while Facebook does encourage its users to share certain kinds of
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information and discourage sharing other kinds, it still provides an arena for them to
potentially learn much more about some members of their social network than face-toface interaction is likely to provide. It offers its users a chance to provide such
information about themselves through both personal revelation and observation and the
appropriation of cultural symbols and pop-culture items, aligning themselves with certain
communities through what they write and share.
Arola reminds us that Facebook users “are encouraged to enact and understand
identities through interaction with others, not through a tightly controlled presentation”
(12). This conception of identity as the product of interaction between user and
community coincides with postmodern notions of the writing subject’s identity as a
negotiation between writer and audience, as a social construction based on the interests,
values, and norms of the community.
In the following section I align this negotiation/construction of identity with
ethos, arguing that the ongoing construction of a personal ethos through interaction is an
inherent purpose of all Facebook discourse. As such I argue to consider this the ruling
exigency in the rhetorical situation of Facebook discourse.

Ethos Replaces Exigence

In Bitzer’s formulation an exigence is a “defect, an obstacle, something waiting to
be done” (6). They are central to rhetorical situations because discourse is aimed at
exigencies. In Bitzer’s words rhetorical situations are “a complex of persons, events,
objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely
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or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human
decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence” (6).
What makes an exigence rhetorical is its ability to be affected or removed by discourse.
Overcoming this perceived “obstacle” is the reason for utterance in Bitzer’s rhetorical
situation.
It has already been established that Facebook discourse by design is social and
informal, even conversational. Texts composed about where one is eating dinner or a
music video that one likes are obviously not texts of the character Bitzer has in mind.
Quite often Facebook compositions are trivial and their subject is no more than the
interests of the writer. It seems then that if Facebook discourse can be said generally to be
about anything, it is about the people creating the discourse. The stakes are often so low
that Bitzer’s definition of an exigence simply does not describe such discourse. His
insistence that an exigence of his description must exist in a situation if we are to call it
rhetorical seems to render the application of his framework to Facebook untenable.
Both Bitzer and Consigny define rhetorical situations as containing problems to
be solved. Bitzer’s problems form externally and approach the rhetor well-defined;
Consigny’s are less determinate, and the rhetor “shape[s] the indeterminacies, thereby
formulating problems” (177). One reason that it is difficult to find an exigence in every
Facebook post is that often enough the content of a post is quite obviously not engaging
anything that could easily be construed as a problem. However, a closer look at the role
that an exigence plays in Bitzer’s theory allows one to bettr understand if Facebook
writing contains a correlative element. Bitzer writes that the exigence “strongly invites
utterance” (4). The exigence is the reason for discourse in Bitzer’s rhetorical situation,
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the target at which the discourse aims. It is also both an “obstacle” and a “something
waiting to be done”—either a problem or an as-yet-unrealized ending. What, then, might
the corresponding element in Facebook communication be? Why—if there is one why—
do people decide to write? What is the reason?
What people write and share on Facebook is in large part a function of humanity’s
basic impulse and desire to improve communication. It is a new way to reach people.
Beyond that, what people share on Facebook is meant to be a reflection, even a
representation, of who they are, and sometimes who they want to be. It is, as already
mentioned, as wide-ranging in topic and importance as conversation itself. Taken
together, along with one’s profile, these compositions represent a user’s Facebook
identity.
I argue in this section that the underlying impetus of Facebook interaction is not
an exigence. Rather, it is the construction and performance of a public identity, a virtual
ethos. If there is one thing that all Facebook communication has in common it is that
every post and comment, every link and every “like,” contributes to how the person who
shared or wrote it is perceived by their network. As I will show in this section, users are
acutely, sometimes painfully aware of this. In a further departure from Bitzer’s view of
rhetorical situations, I argue that this construction of ethos is an inherently social act, a
negotiation between the Facebook writer and her network, and I show how Facebook
facilitates this negotiation. It offers its users novel opportunities to educate themselves
about and align themselves with the interests and values of people and groups that they
want to be identified with, largely on their own timetable. Because these actions are
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visible to one’s entire network, the combination of control and exposure of one’s identity
on Facebook is unparalleled for the average citizen.
Users construct an ethos through engagement and alignment with communities
and groups, both formal and informal. When updated to suit postmodern theory ethos
captures the interactive and social nature of the construction of Facebook identities. In
this section I discuss the evolution of ethos from its classical origins to contemporary
conceptions that account for theoretical shifts in the way we understand identity. This
detailed discussion of ethos is meant to underscore and better explain my claim that its
construction is the closest that the rhetorical situation of Facebook interaction has to an
exigence, taken as a whole.
Next, I analyze how such ethos construction actually happens by way of examples
from my Facebook Wall in an attempt to more fully illustrate both the constant presence
of considerations of ethos and the complexities at work in even low-stakes Facebook
conversation. These examples will also serve to highlight how the constraints mentioned
previously effect the process of ethos construction.

Ethos as a Contemporary Concept

Facebook would seem to be a rhetorical site in which ethos plays an important
role because social networks allow us to transmit so much about ourselves to others and
vice versa. Aristotle himself claims that ethos is “the most authoritative form of
persuasion” (1.2 1356a). While that may still hold true, one cannot simply appropriate
Aristotle’s term with its original definition and context and apply it to contemporary
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rhetorical discourse, especially not the conversational writing on social networks. After
all, Aristotle’s work is two millennia old, so any contemporary discussion of ethos must
account for our more complete understanding of human behavior and communication. As
Jim Corder remarks, “Aristotle among us, I reckon, would write a different rhetoric”
(“On Argument” 34).
Obviously, On Rhetoric was written in and for Aristotle’s historical moment.
Therefore, underlying Aristotelian rhetoric are classical notions of human behavior,
psychology, and communication. Conceptions of identity and subjectivity play a large
role in our understanding of how rhetoric works, and to the degree that our understanding
of such concepts has evolved over two millennia our concept of ethos should also evolve.
Indeed, there has been considerable scholarship devoted to such an evolution. As
theoretical frameworks have emerged and offered scholars new vantage points for
studying Aristotelian ethos, their work has led not only to updated concepts but also to a
more sophisticated understanding of Aristotle’s own conception of ethos.

Postmodernism, Etymology, and Ethos

Over the last twenty years the concept of ethos has enjoyed a revival in the
professional literature. And while the projects for which ethos has been revisited vary
greatly, a number of scholars have been forced to reckon with the history of the term and
its relevance to contemporary rhetorical scholarship. In “Constructing Essences: Ethos
and the Postmodern Subject of Feminism,” Johanna Schmertz summarizes the impetus
behind the recent scholarship on ethos:
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The more dynamic models of ethos have appeared for two reasons. First, postEnlightenment conceptions of the subject suggest that a rhetor cannot sufficiently
transcend his environment to exercise complete control of his ethos. He can no
longer be described in terms of cutting out his character to fit the character of his
audience. Second, there exists a rich tradition of conflicting interpretations of
ethos, stemming in large part from confusion as to the word’s etymology. (84)
According to some scholars this etymological “confusion” is not as much a
product of Aristotle’s own conception of ethos but of the tendency in traditional rhetoric
over the last half-century to simplify the term’s meaning in textbooks and other teaching
tools in order to render ethos more comprehensible to students. Traditional rhetorical
pedagogy throughout the 20th century has often translated Aristotelian ethos as an
“ethical appeal” in conjunction with pathos, the appeal to emotion, and logos, the appeal
to reason. Edward P. J. Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student is a notable
example. In “The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric” Kathleen E. Welch
decries this simplification—what she calls “translation-as-substitution”—for its quality of
flattening concepts. This “erroneous concept of one-to-one correspondence of meaning”
not only flattens concepts, it can make them seem irrelevant. Welch remarks that
reducing all of ethos to an “ethical proof” leads to “only residual ancient connections
remain[ing] for the current reader” (13, 17).
Schmertz also notes in “Constructing Essences” that James Kinneavy’s “Theory
of Discourse” distorts the complexity of ethos by mapping it along with pathos and logos
onto the points of the communication triangle. In Kinneavy’s conception ethos is
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considered as an ethical proof and then transferred to the “encoder” point of the triangle,
placing it unproblematically in the domain and under the control of the speaker.
One major problematic aspect of tendencies toward reduction and translation-assubstitution is that they place ethos discreetly under the control of the speaker. To a
number of scholars this amounts to a misreading of the term’s etymological origins.
Nedra Reynolds, in “Ethos as Location: New Sites for Understanding Discursive
Authority,” links this misreading to simple one-to-one translations, and locates its
meaning instead in roots that reflect a postmodern understanding of the term:
As philosophers concerned with ethics—or rhetoricians opposed to Aristotle’s
contingencies—have encountered ethos, they have felt compelled to make it
‘ethical appeal’; in other words, to translate it with the use of the word ethical,
even though its Greek roots are habit, custom, and character. Careful attention to
the etymology of ethos . . . helps to reestablish ethos as a social act and as a
product of a community’s character. (327).
Postmodern interpretations problematize the concept of an individualized and
controllable ethos as not only ignorant of the term’s roots but also ignorant of how
identity and communication operate in a socially constructed reality. Recent scholarship
has made a compelling case that the apparent ambiguities in Aristotle’s own concept of
ethos allow us to reconceive complexities in Aristotle’s work in light of new theory.
Specifically, scholars have argued that close readings of On Rhetoric that place emphasis
on ethos’ roots in habit and custom reward the reader with an understanding of character
as something that is audience-centered and communally constructed.
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S. Michael Halloran writes in “Aristotle’s Concept of Ethos” that “ethos
emphasizes the conventional rather than the idiosyncratic, the public rather than the
private” (60). In his reading, “to have ethos is to manifest the virtues most valued by the
culture to and for which one speaks” (60). In her study of pioneer womens’ writing, Julie
Nelson Christoph offers a similar reading of Aristotle. However, her work also reminds
us of a crucial division in Aristotle’s concept that stems from classical notions of identity.
Christoph writes that “the interactive nature of the ethos that the Aristotelian speaker
constructs in the speech is such that the ethos is more a testament to communal values
than to any privately held values of the speaker,” the implication being that, to Aristotle,
there is still some distance between the real character of the speaker and that speaker’s
awareness of the audience’s character (663). She notes later that Aristotle’s “instruction
on how to adapt ethos to an audience depends heavily on the ability of the rhetor to
deliberately control all aspects of his ethos” (664), a dependence that stands at odds with
contemporary theories of identity construction.
Any use of ethos in contemporary writing theory meant to describe contemporary
writing circumstances must, as Christoph says, “incorporate contemporary conceptions of
identity, which are much less stable than those that Aristotle presents—and much less
under the control of the individual” (665). In recent scholarship, descriptions of an ethos
that consider and absorb these contemporary conceptions of identity share two common
features. The first is that ethos is located not in the speaker but in the space between
speaker and community—between rhetor and audience. The second, which follows from
the first, is that attempts by a rhetor to control her ethos are not seen as manipulation but
as a becoming, or as an idealization.
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In its contemporary usage ethos often describes not an individual but a collective
or group of some sort. Eras may have an ethos. So may disciplines or vocations. Halloran
offers the example that “if at an academic conference or colloquium I speak with some
authority, it is partly because I manage to look and sound the way professors are
supposed to . . . I make present some important aspects of what we can call ‘the
professorial ethos’ “(62). By examining this community-centered usage we can more
easily grasp ethos’ social constructedness. Of course, Halloran’s “professorial ethos” is a
product of his identity, but more importantly certain salient aspects of that identity have
been shaped by the his perception of the expectations, norms, and values of the
community he has come to identify with. In other words his ethos has not been
manufactured for the professorial community; rather such a position has been constructed
by that community and filled by Halloran. This is ethos as, according to Nedra Reynolds,
“a complex set of characteristics constructed by a group, sanctioned by that group, and
more readily recognizable to others who belong or who share similar values” (327).
Conceiving things this way problematizes ethos’ place in the communication
triangle, not to mention highlighting once again the inadequacies of Bitzer’s concept of
rhetorical situation. Scholars have different ways of characterizing such a detachment of
ethos from its classical and traditional location. Johanna Schmertz argues that this
amounts to a “subject-object split,” which itself accounts for issues translating ethos into
modern terms. To Schmertz, “unanchored from the speaker, ethos becomes Ethos, and in
doing so floats above its mere instantiation in material objects. It colors the rhetorical
situation, signaling a convergence or lack thereof between its elements, but does not
reside within it” (85).
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Other scholars offer space-centric metaphors in order to theorize ethos. Karen
Burke LeFevre, arguing for a social perspective on rhetorical invention reaching back to
Aristotle’s concept of character, makes the case that audience and community are
necessary for rhetorical invention and for meaningful ethos. She writes that “in written
composition, the social matrix of necessary others who form community and audience is
less obvious [than speaking], but nevertheless present. Ethos, we might say, appears in
that socially created space, in the ‘between,’ the point of intersection between speaker or
writer and listener or reader” (46).
Community-centered conceptions of ethos must of course take into account that
contemporary, fragmented selves are members of many communities simultaneously.
The agency that rhetors maintain in presenting a socially-constructed ethos deals in large
part with an awareness of the particular community one is interacting with. Even if
character is negotiated between the subject and the community, a subject who is a
member of many communities must at least be able to emphasize the aspects of her
identity that have been formed in relation to whatever community she addresses at a
given moment, which takes practice. Reynolds writes that “ethos, in fact, occurs in the
‘between’ as writers struggle to identify their own positions at the intersections of various
communities and attempt to establish authority for themselves and their claims” and also
that “speakers or writers develop their ethos by practicing in the accustomed gathering
places of the society: in our contemporary technological culture, those gathering places
are often written texts” (333). Indeed, in our culture those gathering places are often
social networks like Facebook, where people are also written into being.
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This practice is often taking place subconsciously during interaction. One learns
the customs and habits of a discourse community through participation as well as
observation. And a socially constructed ethos is just that—constructed, meaning that the
individual subject is not simply mimicking or projecting a community’s values back at
them from a safe intellectual distance. Rather, as Reynolds notes, “subjects are formed by
the habits of their culture” (328). Neither is ethos stable in this conception. Subjects are
continually seeking out new positions from which to assert themselves. This explains
Schmertz’s re-definition of ethos as “neither manufactured nor fixed, neither tool nor
character, but rather the stopping points at which the subject (re)negotiates her own
essence . . ” (86), or Reynold’s claim that ethos “shifts and changes over time, across
texts, and around competing spaces” (326).
Unshackled from its position solely within the individual and updated in light of
contemporary theory, ethos becomes a valuable concept for understanding the
composition happening on electronic social networks like Facebook. Such an exploration
needs still to reconcile the particularities of Facebook composition with a socialconstructionist view of ethos.

Ethos and the Facebook Wall

Erving Goffman’s 1959 study of the presentation of self found that, whether or
not the social performer was truly sincere, cues off of which the performance was based
came from an estimation of the values and expectations of the current audience: “when an
individual presents himself before others, his performance will tend to incorporate and

!

39!

!
exemplify the officially accredited values of the society, more so, in fact, than does his
behavior as a whole” (35). This conception meshes well with current reading of
Aristotelian ethos. Goffman claims that the result is the performance of a “role” that is
culturally prescribed. Writing of this roleplaying, Goffman states that “to be a given kind
of person, then, is not merely to possess the required attributes, but also to sustain the
standards of conduct and appearance that one’s social grouping attaches thereto” (75).
The perception of “roles” that guide performance might also be seen as the
agreed-upon values, behaviors and interests that collectively make up a community or
group’s ethos. One must, of course, somehow internalize the ethos of the community one
wishes to belong to. As Reynolds reminds us, ethos is the product of practicing discourse
in the “gathering places” common to such a community (333).
Facebook’s high interactivity and visibility between users allows those users to
gather vast amounts of information about the members of their network and disseminate
vast amounts of information about their selves. The interplay between information sent
and information received made possible by Facebook creates an environment where
“code tasting and testing”—the ability to “try on” or experiment with new cultural
identifiers—becomes as easy as clicking a mouse. However, it also involves calculations
on the writer’s part about how their audience will receive any action or lack thereof. In
the moment of composition, such considerations might be made with a near subconscious
rapidity, but they are nevertheless quite complex.
As mentioned in the previous section, users’ profiles and a substantial amount of
the information that they share are related to culture items. Frieshtat and Sandlin note that
contemporary youth “negotiate and construct identities through expressions of cultural
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symbols” (508). The ultimate effects of understanding identity through appropriations of
popular culture are not within the scope nor are they of much interest to this study. It is of
great interest that this is the form identity construction often takes.
Consider that, especially for youths, social groups have long been formed around
cultural tastes in music, movies, clothes, and other forms of entertainment. People with
common taste in commercial art and similar entertainment preferences have material on
which to base interaction. Calling on the work of Joshua Meyrowitz, Williams notes that
“mass popular culture has created common cultural references that are shared by millions
of people” and that “the casual discussion of popular television programs has served the
same social function as conversations about the weather in terms of providing material of
which everyone could have both some knowledge and opinion” (27). And while some
may decry the emergence of a society in which, say, a person’s tastes in television shows
factor into others’ opinions of who that person is, it is nonetheless the case. Consider the
following example from a friend’s Facebook page:

Fig. 10. Arrested Development.
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The posted picture was taken during a political event in early 2011 concerning the
U.S. government’s budget deficit. The text on the poster, “there’s always money in the
banana stand,” is a reference to a plot line from the short-lived cult television show
Arrested Development. Ryan did not take this photo, but came across it while surfing the
web and decided to share it with his Facebook network. According to Williams, this sort
of appropriation is common within social networks designed to facilitate convergence
culture: “the desire to take ownership of a text, regardless of its author, and the
confidence and authority to do so, is another mark of convergence culture” (29).
A quick investigation into how this post might reflect on Ryan should offer some
hint of the complexity I have mentioned can be found in pop culture references. First,
consider the context for this photo. America’s recent budget deficit has become an issue
of national importance and has even spawned a once fringe and now mainstream
conservative grassroots movement calling itself the “Tea Party.” Ryan’s post, however,
neutralizes the seriousness of the issue through its humor, and through this post Ryan
identifies with neither conservative nor liberal viewpoints on the deficit issue. Rather, it
suggests that he is aware of this current event but not necessarily engaged with it, which
becomes more apparent because this is the only post of his that mentions this particular
political issue.
There is then the Arrested Development reference itself. Arrested Development is
often considered by critics to be one of television’s great and most sophisticated sitcoms.
It was also cancelled after three seasons due to its inability to attract mass audiences. For
some perspective, the sitcom Two and a Half Men has over 27,000,000 Facebook fans,
while Arrested Development has a little over 1,500,000. Without making a value
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judgment about either show, it seems fair to suggest that Arrested Development’s brand
of humor was aimed at a smaller, more discerning demographic, or in any event was
consumed by such a demographic. Through this reference, Ryan positions himself within
that demographic. Moreover, he positions himself as someone familiar enough with the
show to recognize a single line from a single episode. This post acts as a lightning rod for
other devoted fans of Arrested Development who are, one must remember, also
constructing an ethos through their identifications with Ryan’s post.
But even as pop culture appropriations such as this one identify users with both
culture items and the community surrounding these items, it can also be a point of
division. Important here is the fact that how one perceives Ryan’s use of this popular
culture text depends on how one perceives the item of culture—in this case Arrested
Development. As Williams notes, “because these images are adopted from larger popular
culture texts, how we respond to them will be influenced by our relationship to the
original text, and the original text’s position in the larger culture” (34). The opinion that a
user has formed about the popular culture content will inevitably be transferred, at least
in part, onto the person choosing to publicly share and align themselves with that content.
Therefore users relinquish some control over how they are perceived when using popular
culture symbols to construct identities.
Alignment with certain types of entertainment is still relatively low stakes
compared to more divisive ideological identifications. Political affiliations and stances on
so called “hot button” social issues still tend to convey a greater or at least less
ambiguous sense of who one is than, for instance, interest in a certain movie. Take, for
example, the following post by a friend that showed up on my News Feed:
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Fig. 11. Link, gay rights.
Perhaps in this case I could have been unaware that my friend had any interest in
politics, specifically the debate over gay rights. I have a number of options for interacting
with this friend. Were I to push the “Like” symbol, my friend would be alerted that I
“like” this post—in other words, that I have made a point of engaging with the idea that
she has shared and on some level agree with her position or share her interest. Further, I
could choose to comment, at which point what I wrote would show up directly under this
post and be visible to both her and my entire network. I could agree or disagree, and
either way her opinion of me would be altered in some way. It is even possible for a
small discussion or “thread” to ensue in the comment section. Or perhaps I could have
clicked on the link out of a general curiosity about and ignorance of the topic being
shared and my awareness that in general I agree with this friend’s political opinions. In
this way I might engage with an article that changes my mind about an issue. At that
point I could then click “Share” and post this same article on my own Wall, at which
point it would enter my network’s News Feed under my name (with credit to the original
poster).

!

44!

!
With both this example and the previous deficit/Arrested Development example,
though, my interpretation as an audience member of the posted content relies in large part
on both my history with the user and my knowledge of her other posts and identified
interests. This is necessary in part because, as Williams has noted, “popular culture
content is almost always displayed without comment or explanation” (34). This means
that rather than providing context for such content through writing, users allow and
expect their Facebook profiles to provide this context for them.
As I mentioned, Ryan’s post highlights a political issue without taking a political
stance. But other parts of his Facebook profile show that he “likes” both Barack Obama
and Socialism, and these identifications affect the overall context in which his audience
interprets what he posts. Amy’s post is not accompanied by any commentary that
suggests how she feels about the marriage equality article’s content, but both her
“likes”—LGBTQ Nation, an LGBT magazine—and the content of some of her other
posts frame the audience’s interpretation of this and other posts.
What one chooses to share on Facebook is an important part of one’s
construction of ethos. Also important is what and who one chooses to engage. Facebook
offers users the opportunity to browse the profile of every member of their network and
align themselves with the interests of those that they perceive themselves to be like or
wish to be more like. Users interact according to perceptions of their audience developed
in the physical world and enhanced online. This enhancement, or “pruning,” as Glynda
Hull has called it can be considered a form of idealization—of attempting to more closely
resemble the sorts of people that we would like to become, or at least be known as.
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Construction of such an image relies on browsing, learning, and appropriating ideas,
beliefs, and interests of those in a user’s network who they wish to be associated with.
Because all of these actions are immediately redirected to the News Feed and
archived on one’s own Wall, one’s choices and words become one’s identity. But this
identity is not stable, nor is it unified. Facebook is a gathering place for many people with
disparate interests. Nobody with hundreds of Facebook friends interacts equally with all
of them or considers them part of the same social group outside of Facebook. One’s
virtual ethos is a balance between the various communities to which he belongs, the
multiplicity of selves that he embodies.
Maintaining one’s ethos can require complex considerations, as shown here. For
example, how an action, be it the posting of a link or “liking” a particular post of
someone else’s, reflects back on a user through its projection onto both her Wall and her
network’s News Feed. Considerations like these are the impetus for rhetorical action on
Facebook. Bitzer’s concept of exigence is not entirely irrelevant, of course. As the
element that “invites utterance,” the thing for which and about which a rhetorical piece
exists, it occupies a necessary place in the rhetorical situation. However, as this section
has attempted to show, Bitzer’s definition of an exigence and his insistence that situations
are not rhetorical without one cannot quite be reconciled with the kind of rhetorical
communication taking place on Facebook.
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Audience

Rhetoric cannot exist without an audience. Considerations of audience are present
in some form throughout every advancement in rhetorical theory. Audience is always
there because persuasion implies its existence. Its continued prominence as an element of
rhetorical theory suggests that it must be a useful and even crucial concept, but it is also
an elusive one.
No treatment of the rhetorical situation from Bitzer’s original text through the late
1980s has denied the necessity of audience, but neither have they devoted much space or
intellectual energy to describing exactly what the audience of a rhetorical situation might
look like, how it might act, and to what degree a rhetor must consider her audience. In the
1990s, scholars like Barbara Biesecker, Garret and Xiao, and Craig R. Smith and Scott
Lybarger began incorporating postmodern theory into discussions of the audience’s role
in the rhetorical situation. Yet even then, with the exception of Biesecker’s work, the
nature of audience goes largely uninvestigated.
It should also be noted that the concept of audience as conceived in work
specifically on rhetorical situation does not evolve at the same speed or even along the
same lines as the concept of audience as written about more generally by scholars from
Andrea Lunsford to Walter Ong to Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Or
perhaps it is more correct to suggest that Bitzer and others who wrote on the rhetorical
situation assumed that then-current notions of audience would be unproblematically read
into their work. Whatever the case we have to look to Lunsford, Ong, and others for
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substantive considerations of audience not only as they might relate rhetorical situations
in general, but to the rhetorical situation of Facebook composition in particular.
I begin this section by briefly explaining how the concept of audience has figured
into previous work on rhetorical situation, focusing specifically on the near absence of
detailed investigations, critical or otherwise, into audience in the context of scholarship
on rhetorical situation. Then I explain how the most influential scholarship on audience in
composition studies, though necessary for understanding a contemporary rhetorical
situation, cannot fully account for all of the possibilities of discourse on Facebook.
Finally, I argue for the need to borrow from various theorizations of audience to form a
concept that combines seemingly incompatible visions of audience as both present and
fictionalized to fully describe the range of audiences that Facebook writers are faced
with, as well as the new model of communication made possible by computer-mediated
social networking technology.

The Audience Constituent in Rhetorical Situations

In “The Meaning of Audience,” Douglas B. Parks writes that “the term
‘audience,’ old and powerful as it is in the rhetorical tradition, might almost be said to
mean too much, to block thought by making us think we know what we are talking about
when we often do not” (248). Indeed, for a cornerstone concept of rhetoric there has been
relatively little theorization of audience itself. Parks further notes that “within certain
contexts, most notably those of classical rhetoric and argumentation, audience is
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relatively easy to talk about. Yet outside those contexts our grasp on it is much hazier
than I suspect we would like to admit” (247).
But as we know, the boundaries of classical rhetoric and logical argument make
up only a fraction of the discourse we now consider rhetorical. Even Bitzer’s framework
for identifying rhetorical discourse, restrictive as it may now seem, expands the
boundaries of rhetoric well beyond what Aristotle prescribed and therefore falls subject to
“hazy” conceptions of audience. In fact, it is frameworks like Bitzer’s that Park is
referring to when he describes the tendency to treat the meaning of audience as selfevident. Nor is he the only scholar calling attention to the issue. In “Rethinking the
Rhetorical Situation,” Biesecker makes the even broader claim that most considerations
of the rhetorical situation following Bitzer’s make this same error:
At least in the twentieth century a preoccupation with audience has often served
as the distinguishing characteristic of critical practice in our discipline. Yet, even
in essays explicitly seeking to develop a theory of the rhetorical situation (with
audience invariably identified as one of its constituent elements), the concept of
audience itself receives little critical attention: in most cases, audience is simply
named, identified as the target of discursive practice, and then dropped. (122)
She then singles out Bitzer, not only because his theory so clearly demonstrates her point
but also because it is the framework from which subsequent others follow. For his part
Bitzer spends only a paragraph describing the audience constituent even though it makes
up a full third of the relevant elements of rhetorical situations. Audience is treated as a
necessary but self-explanatory aspect of rhetorical situations, described only by its ability
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to act as a “mediator of change.” This ability to execute some action is what separates a
truly rhetorical audience from “mere seers or hearers” (7).
This is as far as the investigation into audience goes. We are not told how one
might distinguish one’s true audience from “mere hearers” because Bitzer’s framework
leaves no need for the rhetor to consider audience directly at all. The rhetor’s discourse is
dictated by the situation, and while we can assume the audience plays some role in
shaping the situation of which it is a part it is not clear at all what that role entails. The
critical responses by Vatz and Consigny make no issue of Bitzer’s treatment of audience,
perhaps because of more fundamental concerns and perhaps because of the haziness that
Park and Biesecker identify.

Audience from Adressed /Invoked to Invited

Perhaps what complicates descriptions of a unified Facebook audience most are
the various options for interacting with one’s network, and how certain of these options
allow us to write to and for people in novel ways. There are a number of explanations for
these novelties. For one thing, Facebook is an Internet environment, and the Internet
changed how writing is affected by time, more or less collapsed formal barriers to larger
audiences and drastically expanded the average user’s opportunities for writing about
subjects of personal interest. Social networks take this even further, acting essentially as
platforms for conversation that happens to be written. On Facebook this written
conversation is published in an interactive, continually updating environment where the
audience is exposed to and involved with texts in ways that the field’s popular
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frameworks for theorizing audience simply cannot account for—nor could they be
expected to.
Digital writing spaces are simply evolving more quickly than our field is
producing frameworks for understanding these spaces. Thus the need to explore and
modify the dominant conceptions of audience in composition studies to better describe
Facebook’s particular writing environment, specifically to accommodate the subject
matter of Facebook writing and the novel access to audience that it affords. Examining
earlier theories provides a glimpse at the basic assumptions about writing and rhetoric
that underlie them. Judging these assumptions against the reality of Facebook writing and
following them to their conclusions in the texts allows for a rough construction of an
audience framework for Facebook that combines the relevant and sometimes paradoxical
elements of previous scholarship.
Though these earlier frameworks were first theorized more than thirty years ago,
scholarship on audience still draws heavily from the work of Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca’s New Rhetoric, Ong’s “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction, ” Lunsford
and Ede’s “Audience Addressed, Audience Invoked, ” and to some extent Park’s
“Meaning of ‘Audience’ “ and “Analyzing Audience.” These works build off of, borrow
and diverge from one another, creating a rich understanding of the role of audience in
pre-digital modern environments.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric is perhaps the most
comprehensive single work on argumentation in the modern era and the earliest treatment
of audience selected here. Written in 1969, it acts as a call to consider the importance of
the audience to rhetorical argument and is partly responsible for the interest in the
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concept of audience in the professional literature through the 70s and 80s. The authors’
focuses when discussing audience is on forming “a concept of the anticipated audience as
close as possible to reality” (20). Implicit here is the view that a rhetor must construct her
audience in her own mind but with a clear view to “real” people. Aware that audience
members have fragmented loyalties, though, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce
the universal audience, a concept whose power comes not from analysis but from the
persuasive force of logic. It is important to note that for the authors a universal audience
has value strictly in the context of formal argumentation. Park writes that this concept is
“clearly a set of conventionally accepted assumptions about the proper nature of
argument: that it be controlled by reason, that all parties place a premium on
disinterestedness and tacitly agree that respect for truth is a prime measure of
persuasiveness” (252).
Though oriented specifically toward logical argument, a number of concepts from
The New Rhetoric have found their way into works taking a much more inclusive view of
the boundaries of rhetorical discourse. And perhaps more importantly, Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s discussion of audience framed the debates about the concept that
would follow, from the addressed physical audience of speech to Ong’s view of audience
as a “fiction” and resulting attempts to dissolve this polarity in favor of more complex
frameworks for theorizing audience.
Writing in 1982, Park remarked that “the meanings of ‘audience’ tend to diverge
in two general directions: one toward actual people external to a text, the audience whom
the writer must accommodate; the other toward the text itself and the audience implied
there . . . ” (247). This split more or less provides the context for theories of audience
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throughout the 1970s and 80s. Scholarship on audience either adopted one or another of
these perspectives or attempted to reconcile them and move them forward. The direction
focusing on “actual people” was typical of classroom instruction American colleges into
the 70s. This is the “audience addressed” contingency in Lunsford and Ede’s formulation.
Roughly, this orientation is characterized by a vision of audience as an identifiable and
knowable collective according to which discourse should be shaped. According to
Lunsford and Ede, the “audience addressed” framework tended to shift too much focus
onto the audience, distorting its importance (158).
The other “direction” privileges an implied or “fictionalized” audience and
grounds its perspective in the differences between speech and writing. This perspective,
typified and popularized by Ong’s “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction,” claims
that because writing lacks the immediacy of speech and happens in solitude rather than
before an audience, writers cannot verify any characteristics about their audience. Writers
cannot know their audience empirically or utilize the context in which that audience
experiences the discourse. According to Ong, “context for the spoken word is simply
present, centered in the person speaking and the one or ones to whom he [sic] addressed
himself” whereas apart from special circumstances “the person to whom the writer
addresses himself is not present at all. Moreover . . . he must not be present” (10).
Ong’s central thesis, focused as it is on professional writers of narrative fiction
and poetry, is that the audience must be fictionalized in the writer’s mind. The writer
must “construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of
role,” and correspondingly the audience must “fictionalize itself”; that is, a reader must
adopt the role that the writer has constructed for him. This involves responding to “cues”
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provided by the writer about how a text is to be read—or, more accurately, from what
position or perspective it is to be read. On this point Park describes a writer who
“creates[s] a context into which readers may enter and to varying degrees become the
audience that is implied there” (249).
In “The Meanings of Audience,” an article that anticipates Lunsford and Ede’s
popular and influential “Audience Addressed, Audience Invoked,” Park forwards a view
of audience that allows for the “two general directions” mentioned earlier but privileges
the direction typified by Ong. Park offers four meanings of audience:
1. Anyone who happens to read a discourse
2. Readers “as they are involved in a rhetorical situation”—focused on the
effects of a discourse after the fact
3. A writer’s conception or “set of awarenesses” about a general readership that
shapes a discourse
4. An “ideal conception set forth in the way the discourse itself defines and
creates contexts for readers”—the audience of Ong’s conception, a set of roles
(249)
Park finds the last two meanings “obviously the most important for teachers or for
anyone interested in forms of discourse” (249). As the first two meanings show, Park’s
study takes into account the existence of circumstances where an audience is not
fictionalized but material, however he ultimately favors Ong’s underlying assumption
that a written text separates writer and audience in space and time and therefore requires
writers to construct, in some sense, their audience. The attempt to reconcile both
“directions” of audience in Park’s treatment serves as a useful segue between Ong’s work
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and Lunsford and Ede’s, as their central project is to borrow form both of the directions
Park identifies and offer a more complex framework than either provides.
Lunsford and Ede’s “Audience Addressed, Audience Invoked” endeavors to
generate from these two conceptions of audience a richer, more dynamic concept of
audience. The authors rightly claim that Ong’s “representative situations—the orator
addressing a mass audience versus a writer alone in a room—oversimplify the potential
range and diversity of both oral and written communication systems” (161). And while
they agree with his assertion that writers must create roles for readers, they argue that he
oversimplifies once again when describing the available methods and models for writers
to create those roles, and finally that he underemphasizes the role that the audience plays
in shaping a text: “Ong fails adequately to recognize the constraints placed on the writer,
in certain situations, by the audience. He fails . . . to acknowledge that readers’ own
experiences, expectations, and beliefs do play a central role in their reading of a text . . . ”
(165) In short, Lunsford and Ede find that proponents of both audience addressed and
audience invoked oversimplify what to them is a dynamic and very complicated concept.
Ong’s inattention to the complexities and various forms of both writing and
speech lead him to overlook areas in which writing tasks might analyze and fictionalize
an audience. The authors level a similar charge at proponents of the “audience
addressed” conception as well, focusing on the dangers inherent in assuming that one can
always know and anticipate the beliefs and expectations of a material audience. Lunsford
and Ede offer various hypotheticals to strengthen their position, including classroom
assignments, working with editors, and revising internal reports as evidence of situations
that involve both addressed (external) and invoked (fictionalized) audiences
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simultaneously. Ultimately, Lunsford and Ede argue for a concept of audience that
“emphasizes the creative, dynamic duality of the process of reading and writing, whereby
writers create readers and readers create writers.” For them, “in the meeting of these two
lies meaning, lies communication” (169).
While their call for a more complex theory of audience brings the concept a step
forward, it is important to note that in all of these conceptions including Lunsford and
Ede’s, the writer and audience being described are fully constituted subjects acting in
isolation. As discussed in the previous section, this perspective on identity and discourse
fails to account for shifts in the theoretical landscape. In fact, Lunsford and Ede concede
this point themselves in their critical reflection on their article twelve years later. The
authors concede that “the subject of discourse in AA/AI . . . is . . . implicitly stable,
unified, and autonomous” and that “we do not pursue the multiple ways in which the
student writer’s agency and identity may be shaped and constrained not only by
immediate audiences but also . . . by the ways in which both she and those audiences are
positioned within larger institutional and discursive frameworks” (“Representing
Audience” 816). This critical reflection exposes certain weaknesses in the underlying
assumptions that inform AA/AI and brings the authors’ work more closely in line with
postmodern treatments of audience like Biesecker’s in “Rethinking the Rhetorical
Situation.”
Biesecker’s work draws on postmodern conceptions of subjectivity in general and
Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism in particular to posit a concept of a less stable
audience subject position, one quite similar to the speaker/writer in the aforementioned
work on ethos by Reynolds, Schmertz, and others.
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Like Reynolds and Schmertz, Biesecker argues for a conception of rhetorical
discourse as generative of new identities, able to alter and construct subjectivities.
According to Biesecker, traditional frameworks like Bitzer’s and those just described
imply that both the speaker and the audience may be persuaded, but their identities are
unaffected by discourse. The discourse or “text” is seen as “an object that mediates
between subjects (speaker and audience) whose identity is constituted in a terrain
different from and external to the particular rhetorical situation” (110). In other words
the problem with Bitzer’s framework is that it implicitly limits rhetorical discourse’s
power by denying its ability to shape a subject’s identity. Biesecker writes:
If any symbolic act is no more than an event that links distinct and already
constituted subjects, then rhetorical discourse bumps up against the impenetrable
and unalterable space of the subject . . . that is to say, if we posit the audience of
any rhetorical event as no more than a conglomeration of subjects whose identity
is fixed prior to the rhetorical event itself, then we must admit that those subjects
have an essence that cannot be affected by the discourse. (110-11)
Biesecker argues that such a view issues from a humanistic interpretation of the subject
as an entity whose origins and essential characteristics are external to and therefore
unaffected by discourse. This is the same interpretation of the subject that the scholars
from the previous section problematized in evolving the concept of ethos, and with good
reason: when one describes the nature of a “subject” that produces discourse one is by
extension also describing the nature of an audience, whose members are subjects situated
in a different position in the rhetorical situation. And while Biesecker’s deconstructionist
model has been seen by some as an “extreme way” of altering the rhetorical situation and
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in any case is not ultimately germane to this project, she makes a valuable contribution to
conceptions of audience by replacing “the common presumption that fixed essences
encounter variable circumstances “ with a “subject whose identity is produced and
reproduced in discursive practices, resituat[ing] the rhetorical situation on a trajectory of
becoming rather than Being” (127).
Biesecker’s model theoretically reconciles the audience constituent of both
Bitzer’s formulation and broader discussions of audience in composition studies with
shifts in thinking brought on by postmodernism and social constructivism. Yet while her
postmodern concept of audience subjectivity is useful to this study due to its parallels
with the work of Schmertz and Reynolds on ethos and postmodernism, her larger
deconstructionist project does not provide a suitable framework for fully considering the
role of the audience in Facebook composition. Without rejecting the concept of writer
and audience as provisional rather than already constituted subjects, and keeping in mind
the power of discourse to shape identities, it is necessary to draw from the work of the
other scholars mentioned in order to highlight the ways in which Facebook presents novel
writer/audience dynamics.

The Facebook Audience

Postmodern notions of subjectivity are not the only example of how scholarly and
technological change affects our understanding of audience. Facebook’s digital writing
environment by its very nature renders some of the underlying assumptions of Ong’s,
Park’s, and Lunsford and Ede’s work at some times irrelevant and other times
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inadequate. Writing practices not long ago impossible have now become commonplace,
but the fundamental reconsiderations that we must engage in with theories of audience in
order to adapt them to Facebook cannot necessarily be transferred to other digital writing
spaces. What makes audience so complicated to consider on Facebook is in part the fact
that audiences and discourses can be different here from those in our non-virtual lives. In
fact, computer-mediated technologies such as Facebook have created new models of
communication that require us to think in different ways about the relationship between
writer and audience that has long informed rhetorical theory.
For most of human history communication took place according to one of two
models: “one-to-one” and “one-to-many.” One-to-one communication has historically
been typified by face-to-face conversation. One-to-many communication was typified by
speeches to crowds or written texts disseminated to the population. Pre-computer
advances in technology changed the terms of these models to communication but did not
change the models. Telephone technology dissolved the previous space boundary of oneto-one communication. Radio and television increased the scope and scale of one-tomany communication as well as the possible components of the message, but they did not
alter the nature of the relationship between sender and receiver. A defining characteristic
of new media interactivity is the development of new models of communicating. This is
especially true of digital spaces wherein users generate and consume the content
available. Mass media scholars Sheizaf Rafaelo and Robert LaRose write that
“collaborative mass media systems, in which the audience is the primary source of media
content as well as its receiver, represent a new and significant departure from mass media
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forms. They expand the very definition of mass media from ‘one-to-many’ to ‘many-tomany’ communication” (277).

Fig. 12. News Feed II.
Facebook is exemplary of many-to-many communication. The Facebook interface
is specifically designed to facilitate it. While this study has focused at length on pop
culture’s influence on Facebook compositions, it should be stressed that there is a
tremendous amount of Facebook composition devoted also to personal activities, daily
timelines of real people’s lives. This News Feed screen shot (fig. 12) serves as an
example of this kind of writing.
Hundreds, sometimes thousands of people are exposed to these messages and
dozens more like them all day every day. Many people are able to communicate with
many other people at the same time about themselves and the minutia of their daily lives.
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Moments deemed worthy can be translated into words and shared with everyone we
know. Meanwhile others are sharing with us, and still others are sharing things not quite
meant for us but in our view.
When the interactivity facilitated by many-to-many communication combines
with a network like Facebook whose purpose is to enhance already established social
connections, writers can compose for familiar audiences. When taking into consideration
the variety of social groups represented by the average user’s network and their ability to
see the posting activity of that user, it begins to seem as though Facebook writers are
often addressing more than one audience in a single message. At other times users
address an audience that is not quite real and not quite fictional.
Rather than frame Facebook as a site where one interacts with a single, cohesive
network, it seems more accurate to consider Facebook as a common ground of interaction
between many of a user’s various “communities.” As such users must write themselves
into existence online among the simultaneous presence of the various communities of
which they are a part. Facebook networks often comprise work acquaintances, school
acquaintances, old friends, family members, and other social groups. Direct
communication between a user and, say, an old college friend will be not only visible but
presented (via the News Feed) to the rest of her network, creating a scenario wherein
members of one social/discourse community of which she is a part have access to her
interactions with her other communities. For example, the following is the status update
of a Facebook friend named Helen, as seen on my News Feed (isolated from the previous
screen shot):

!

61!

!

From Fig. 12.

This comment is not directed at me. It is, in fact, an inside joke, a nonsense that
can make sense only according to some other conversation and some other context. And
yet while I cannot understand it, in a sense I am undoubtedly part of Helen’s audience for
this message. That is, she knows that I can read what she writes. In an important way,
though, I am not her audience. She almost certainly did not consider me when composing
this message. This is important because she almost certainly did consider somebody, or
some group of real people with whom she has shared specific experiences. A
“sausageless pizza dad” is something of meaning to some of her friends, but it is also
unclear to many members of her Facebook network. This is the semi-voyeuristic aspect
of Facebook that, when combined with the social nature of the content shared there,
makes for a rhetorical situation unlike any other medium can yet provide.
When this scenario is considered in terms of popular theories of audience, at least
two problems arise. First, these theories do not account for the possibility of social
interaction in written form. Lunsford and Ede’s examples continually feature either
professional or formal classroom writing contexts and conceive of a writer “catalyzed and
guided by a strong sense of purpose” (164). Ong does offer the example of letter writing
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as an instance with “one clearly determined person, who hardly need fictionalize
himself,” but claims that even then “you must fictionalize him, make him into a special
construct” (19). While there are similarities here to Facebook, writing on Facebook lacks
the formality of the letter because, while asynchronous, responses are much quicker and
apt to be much shorter. Second, neither Lunsford and Ede, nor Ong, nor Park could likely
have conceived of a writing situation quite like that of Wall-to-Wall communication on
Facebook, where a writer was aware of all potential readers but only strictly addressing
one. There is some corollary in public writing situations such as letters to the editor of a
magazine, but the writer is only vaguely aware of the larger audience in that scenario as
“readers of this magazine,” a fictionalization something like Ong describes.
Helen’s status update, unlike wall-to-wall communication, has no specific
intended recipient. Because there is no single recipient, the status update is something
like the kind of writing described by Ong and Park. However, even though there is no
single identified reader, the founding assumption of both Ong and Park’s view of a
writer’s audience—that writers cannot know who their audience is in a material sense—is
not strictly relevant. It is true that the writer of a status update does not know who exactly
will read the update, but she does know who can read it. Presumably, the writer knows
these possible recipients personally—that is, she has met and interacted with them—and
has a complete enough understanding of who they are to invite them into her personal
life. Thus their concrete reality does inform her decision, or at least it has the potential to.
The degree to which Facebook writers consider secondary audience members—
those that a writer knows might see a message, but is not addressing—is an unknown
whose investigation is outside the scope of this study. Williams remarks that the students
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he interviewed spent many hours “tweaking . . . their pages and thinking about how these
pages and their images, references, and songs will be read by friends, acquaintances, and
strangers [strangers in the case of MySpace]” (33). There are also certainly situations in
which the intended audience for a given composition may be somewhat ill-defined; but
the available audience is always well-defined.
To further illuminate this point, I return again to the example of Arrested
Development from the previous section. Ryan clearly does not know exactly which
members of his network will understand this reference, but his previous experiences with
specific people let him know that at least some of his Facebook friends will “get” the
photo’s message. Having posted this message, Ryan might also come to learn of other
fans because of the lightning rod effect mentioned previously and therefore have a clearer
sense of which of his friends identify with this particular interest.

Fig. 13. Arrested Development
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A conception of audience as fictionalized or invented will not suit Facebook.
Audience members are selected. Yet, as I have attempted to show through these
examples, oftentimes messages are directed toward smaller audiences than they are
received by. Thus the rhetorical situation of Facebook is characterized by surveillance, by
continual exposure to one’s entire network. It is also characterized by the speed and ease
with which Facebook users can vacillate between audience member and composer. This
vacillation is something like what Garret and Xiao noticed in their analysis of Opium
War rhetoric, an analysis that led them to claim the necessity of seeing “the audience
rather than speaker as the pivotal element” in rhetorical situations:
The rhetorical situation vis-à-vis the Opium Wars was fluid, dynamic, and highly
interactive. Indeed, the line between the rhetor and audience was highly
permeable since these writers emerged from the situational audience and, to a
great extent, shared with the rhetorical audience the same discourse tradition,
sociopolitical realities, and so on. (38)
The authors consider the rhetor in their particular analysis a “member of the audience”
that would emerge as a composer and then become once again an audience member. The
similarities between the relationship between rhetor and audience that Garret and Xiao
identify and that relationship in the context of Facebook composition are clear, though
the material conditions and content of these two kinds of compositions could hardly be
more different. One can understand the audience’s role in the rhetorical situation of
Facebook by placing it in the “active center of the rhetorical situation,” as the they do,
and by thinking of the relationship between rhetor and audience and one of “mutual
identity building” as both they and Biesecker do.
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We are still left without a satisfying theorization of audience more generally.
Lunsford and Ede do approach a workable definition for understanding audience and
Facebook composition when they argue that “the term audience refers not just to the
intended, actual, or eventual readers of a discourse, but to all those whose image, ideas,
or actions influence a writer during the process of composition” (169). Yet this definition
is broad in a way that fails to capture the differences between computer-mediated writing
on social networks and other forms of writing—even other forms of computer-mediated
writing. Later, Lunsford and Ede suggest that possibly the best way to interpret audience
is as an “unusually rich concept, one which may perhaps be best specified through the
analysis of precise, concrete situations” (169). Indeed the authors seem aware that
theories of audience have a tendency to ignore or diminish the complexities of the
relationship between writer and audience. Because of its historical moment, the
framework they propose is not suited to the digital era, nor are Ong’s and Park’s. The
peculiarities of Facebook—the collection of familiar readers, the high visibility of all
compositions among the entire network—are not typical of all new media rhetorical
situations, though there are certainly common elements. What the field still needs is a
more complete consideration of how new media technologies have altered the
writer/audience relationship with which to ground an “analysis of precise, concrete
situations” in the digital landscape.
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Conclusions: Rhetorical Situations in a New Media Age

Though it requires a great deal of updating and, in the case of Facebook, the
replacement of a full third of its essential elements, Bitzer’s framework shows some
resilience in the face of over four decades of scholarly advancement. The element of
constraints, this thesis shows, must be expanded to account for the ways in which
technological advances, in this case web-page interfaces and user-friendly templates,
constrain action in ways that are relatively new and difficult to notice. I hve also shown
that exigencies do not necessarily exist in forms of certain forms of discourse that are
now considered rhetorical, Facebook writing included. It seems that any serious revision
of Bitzer’s original framework must account for the significant expansion of what can be
called rhetorical discourse. Nor is audience immune to either the expansion of what we
call rhetorical or the advance of technology. The boundaries between audience and writer
on Facebook are blurred and complicated by both the computer-mediated, “many-tomany” communication model of Facebook and the postmodern theoretical lens through
which we now examine that relationship, requiring a conception of audience to be
cobbled together from previous theories.
C-mediated new media writing environments both constrict and expand
possibilities for composition Computer interfaces and templates constrain discourse by
encouraging certain actions and discouraging others. Facebook also offers us more
control over the content of social interactions by offering more time for composition and
multimodal avenues of expression. Sharing links, posting videos and images, and
“liking” are ways of communicating unlike traditional forms of composition can offer.
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Nancy Kaplan and Stuart Molthrop write that perhaps these forms of communication “are
indeed not ‘writing’ since they are not purely typographic or even alphabetic. But . . . the
representation of ideas through advanced technologies still requires the production of
text; it is still composition” (264, emphasis original). This has been an attempt at
examining how these new modes of communication affect our interactions when
combined with the interface of a single social network. Furthermore, it has been an
attempt to update the concept of rhetorical situation to better suit new media
environments and a test of its continued usefulness in conceptualizing the elements that
make up rhetorical discourse.
My work is focused on a small corner of this new media landscape, but an
influential one. It does not speak for the myriad other writing contexts that exist because
of the Internet and the network culture it makes possible. It seems clear that close
examinations of other computer-mediated writing environments are likely to uncover
other unique composing opportunities. Grounding and framing this work according to
Bitzer’s rhetorical situation has created an occasion for considering whether traditional
theories of rhetoric can fully account for composing in the digital era, and if not then
what a “new media rhetoric” might look like and how it might account for the many
unique spaces for composing and the rapid progression and sophistication of Internet
technology. There are also a number of important questions to ask about the effect that
social networks might have on student writing and the potential advantages and
disadvantages of appropriating social networks for classroom use. There is a rich body of
scholarship examining the role that computers and the composing practices they
encourage might play in writing classrooms that reaches as far back as the early 90s and,
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as mentioned in the introduction, has more than one scholarly journal devoted to its
investigation.
This thesis also encourages examinations of the role that Facebook might play in
the classroom. Recently there have been attempts at using Facebook to facilitate and
enrich college writing courses (Balshizer, Poke, Grover, Lauer, Mcneely, Zmilky 2010).
These studies attempt to harness the interactivity of Facebook as well as its popularity in
order to design assignments and curricula that align more closely with the composing
practices of students outside the classroom. We cannot ignore that the Internet has created
a platform for students to compose their social lives. Nancy K Baym notes that “although
computer-mediated communication was not invented with personal interaction in mind,
the rise of the Internet has clarified that this technologically is fundamentally social” (36).
Facebook lends great strength to this perspective and makes clear to writing instructors
just how much composition is now taking pace daily outside of the classroom. The
studies mentioned here do good work toward better understanding the potential
relationship between social writing and classroom writing, but more work needs to be
done.
Facebook is a product of a hyperconnected world in which we can broadcast our
thoughts and observations to everyone we know at any time and everyone we know can
broadcast to us. Naomi Baron writes that we are “always on.” This means that the
contents of our lives can be composed, transmitted, and publicized. It brings to mind
Kenneth Burke’s description of the French realist Stendhal’s character Julien Sorel: “all
his actions thus become rhetorical, framed for their effect.; his life is a spellbinding and
spellbound address to an audience” (36). This performance of identity through
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composition must be better understood, and a field that has devoted itself to writing and
language should be at the forefront of this examination.
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